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SEARCH AND SEIZURE-Automobile Inventory Search
Exception to the Fourth Amendment Expanded
by State v. Williams

INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to
the people the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The constitutionality of inventory searches of vehicles impounded' by the
police has become an increasingly complex and recurring issue. The
theory underlying an inventory search is that a policeman, when he takes
a motorist into custody, should make an inventory of the contents of the
automobile. In theory, the inventory is not a search for evidence, but
rather, is an effort to protect the personal property of the motorist against
loss, protect the police against false claims of theft, and protect the police
against potential danger.' Before 1976, the United States Supreme Court4
had not ruled upon the specific issue of warrantless searches of vehicles.
Resolution of the constitutional issues implicit in inventory searches requires inquiry into the purported administrative justification for the intrusion and a careful balancing of such justification against the individual's
right to privacy.' This Note will consider the case history surrounding
the inventory search of automobiles. The author will then analyze State
v. Williams, 6 a recent New Mexico Supreme Court decision upholding
an inventory search, and will comment on what this decision may mean
for the future.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 6, 1979, Richard Edward Williams displayed a gun at the
checkout counter of a grocery store . 7 He then instructed the cashier at
1.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2. For purposes of this Note, "impounded" means
the purpose of storage or safekeeping until the owner
N.M. 388, 390, 524 P.2d 1004, 1006 (1974).
3. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370
4. Id.
5. Id. at 376 (Powell, J., concurring).
6. 97 N.M. 634, 642 P.2d 1093, cert. denied, 7. 97 N.M. at 636, 642 P.2d at 1095.

a car which has been taken into custody for
is located or released. See State v. Vigil, 86
(1976).
U.S.-.,

103 S. Ct. 101 (1982).
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the checkout counter to remove the cash from the register and put it into
a grocery sack.8 Williams carried this sack to other cash registers in the
store and directed the cashier to empty each register's cash into it. 9 While
Williams was at one of the registers, a customer, wielding a gun, told
Williams to put his gun on the counter. Williams complied. 10 One of the
cashiers called the police, who arrived and arrested Williams."' One of
the officers took Williams to the police station for booking.' 2 During
booking, an officer found a set of keys in Williams' pocket and, without
obtaining a warrant, returned to the crime scene to look for Williams'
car.

13

The officer found a car on the street behind the grocery store. 14 The
car was locked and legally parked. 5 The officer conducted an inventory
search of the automobile's contents. 16 During the search, the officer seized
an Albuquerque city map showing the location of three separate grocery
stores in the area and indicating an "escape route." '7 The officer also
found a checkbook which showed a negative balance. 18
Prior to trial, the defense moved to suppress these items as the fruits
of an illegal search. 19 The trial court denied the motion and admitted the
items into evidence at trial. 20 The jury22found Williams guilty of armed
robbery 2' with a firearm enhancement.
Williams appealed his conviction claiming that the trial court committed
reversible error in refusing to suppress the fruits of a warrantless illegal
search. 23 The New Mexico Court of Appeals found no probable cause to
search the defendant's car where it was found 24 after the defendant was
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 2, State v. Williams (available at the New Mexico
Attorney General's Office, Criminal Appeals Division, Santa Fe, New Mexico).
12. 97 N.M. at 636, 642 P.2d at 1095.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 3.
18. 97 N.M. at 636, 642 P.2d at 1095.
19. Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 3.
20. 97 N.M. at 636, 642 P.2d at 1095.
21. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-2 (1978), provides:
Robbery consists of the theft of anything of value from the person of another
or from the immediate control of another, by use or threatened use of force or
violence. Whoever commits robbery is guilty of a third degree felony.
Whoever commits robbery while armed with a deadly weapon is, for the first
offense, guilty of a second degree felony and, for second and subsequent offenses,
is guilty of a first degree felony.
22. 97 N.M. at 635, 642 P.2d at 1094.
23. Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 5.
24. State v. Williams, No. 4861 (N.M. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1981) (memorandum opinon) (available
at New Mexico Attorney General's Office, Criminal Appeals Division, Santa Fe, New Mexico).
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"well removed from the car and under arrest. "25 Nor did the court find
exigent circumstances, because the vehicle "could not be moved out of
the locality in which a warrant must be sought." 2 6 Because the facts did
not "give rise to any reason for an inventory search," 27 the court reversed
the conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. 2s
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision.29 The issue before the court was whether the search was a proper
inventory search. 3 ° The appellant argued that the trial court committed
reversible error in refusing to suppress the fruits of a warrantless, illegal
search. 3 The state argued that the items were properly received because
the search was a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment and that any error, if found, was harmless.32 The court held
that the search was reasonable and permissible in light of the requirements
for a valid inventory search set forth in State v. Ruffino. 33 In a vigorous
dissent, Justice Sosa concluded that although the defendant was probably
34
guilty of the robbery, his fourth amendment rights had been violated .
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. The Legal Background
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the fourth amendment
to the United States Constitution, has held that an investigator must obtain
a warrant issued by a "neutral and detached" magistrate or judge before
35
intruding into a constitutionally protected area in search of evidence.
The Court decided in Katz v. United States3 6 that "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate
are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment-subject only to a
25. Id.at 2.
26. Id.at 3.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 97 N.M. at 638, 642 P.2d at 1097.
30. Id. at 636, 642 P.2d at 1095. The defendant also assigned error to the trial court's refusal to
instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted armed robbery. The defendant based
this claim on the fact that he never actually possessed the money nor left the store with it. The
implication was that the defendant never "carried away" the money, which is an essential element
of armed robbery. The court held there was no error in refusing the instruction because the asportation
element was satisfied when the cashier, under the defendant's coercion, removed the money from
the register. Id.at 638, 642 P.2d at 1097. The defendant also assigned error to the trial court's
refusal to instruct the jury on the definition of mental disease and as to the consequences of a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity. Again, the court held there was no error because the instruction
that the trial court gave adequately instructed the jury on insanity. Id.
31. Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 5.
32. Plaintiff-Appellee's Answer Brief at I.
33. 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980).
34. 97 N.M. at 638, 642 P.2d at 1097 (Sosa, J. dissenting).
35. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." '3 7 One of
these recognized exceptions is the "automobile exception." 38
The automobile exception originated in 1925 in Carrollv. United States.39
In Carroll,the lower court convicted the defendants for transporting liquor
after federal agents and a state officer had conducted a search of the car.
The defendant moved for suppression of the evidence found in the car
on the basis that the search was illegal. 4 ° The United States Supreme
Court concluded that a vehicle may be searched without a warrant on the
basis of probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband
or illegally possessed goods.4 This authority to search the vehicle exists
independently of any arrest. The Court reasoned that an automobile's
to
mobility presents an exigent circumstance that justifies an exception
42
exists.
search
to
cause
probable
when
requirement
the warrant
Based originally upon practicability, the Supreme Court has expanded
the Carroll exception. In the 1970 case of Chambers v. Maroney,43 the
Court permitted a warrantless search of a car when the search was conducted after the car had been removed from the scene of the arrest. Despite
the fact that the automobile was under police control and in no danger
of being moved as in Carroll, the Court upheld the search. The Court in
Chambers indicated that the lapse of time between the arrest and the later
search was immaterial." The Court noted that "for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars.41
This difference has been attributed to the lessened expectation of privacy
associated with an automobile. "Automobiles, unlike houses, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls,
including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. "46
37. Id. at 357.
38. Exceptions to the warrant requirement also include: (1)search incident to valid arrest, Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (authorizing a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest of the
person of the arrestee and the area within which the arrestee might reach weapons and/or destructible
evidence); (2) hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (warrantless entry and search
permissible when pursuing a felon); (3) plain view doctrine, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971) (warrantless seizure of evidence permitted where a) there has been a prior valid intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area, b) there is then an inadvertent spotting of the evidence in plain
view, and c) there is probable cause to believe that the thing spotted is evidence of a crime); (4)
emergency, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (warrantless search incident to urgent need to
preserve life or avoid injury justified); (5) stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizing
stop and frisk on grounds less substantial than probable cause but limited in intensity and scope to
that necessary to detect weapons); (6) consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
(warrantless search authorized when the owner of the object or place to be searched consents).
39. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
40. Id. at 134.
41. Id. at 153-59.
42. Id. at 153.
43. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
44. Id. at 52.
45. Id.
46. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
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In Cady v. Dombrowski,47 the United States Supreme Court extended
the "automobile exception" to searches that may be described as "caretaker searches." ' 48 In Cady, the police searched a vehicle subsequent to
an accident, and based their search upon the reasonable belief that the
driver, an off-duty policeman, had been carrying a gun in the car. The
police searched the trunk of the car and discovered evidence related to a
homicide. 49 The Supreme Court upheld the investigating officer's conduct
for two main reasons. First, local police are frequently involved in "community caretaking functions" with respect to automobiles.5 0 In Cady,
because the defendant was comatose and his vehicle constituted a nuisance
on the highway, the police had a duty and a right to remove his car to a
different location. Second, after removing the car, the police had a duty
not only to themselves, but to the rest of the community, to remove the
revolver. The Court looked at the totality of the circumstances in Cady
and found that the search was reasonable." The reasonableness of the
search was buttressed by the fact that the police had good reason to
believe that the car contained a revolver.
In South Dakota v. Opperman,52 the Court finally considered the right
of the police to inventory a vehicle lawfully in their custody. In that case,
the police twice ticketed the defendant's illegally parked automobile and
then towed it to the city impound lot pursuant to a local ordinance. The
police inventoried the contents of the car and the discovery of marijuana
in the unlocked glove compartment resulted in the defendant's conviction
for possession of marijuana. 3 The Supreme Court, affirming the conviction, upheld the seizure of the car and its contents on the grounds that
the police had unquestioned authority to remove the vehicle from the
street and that the inventory was a routine, reasonable, and necessary
aspect of the police caretaking function, conducted strictly in accordance
with police department regulations. 4 The Court made it clear that, just
as with any other type of search, the scope of an inventory search must
be reasonable."
B. Inventory Searches
The inventory of an automobile presents a unique problem in the area
of warrantless searches. When an arrest is made of a subject who is in
47. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
48. Id. at 447-48.
49. Id. at 437.
50. Id. at 441. "To permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic ... disabled vehicles will often be
removed from the highways or streets at the behest of police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic
control activities." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976).
51. 413 U.S. at 447.
52. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
53. Id at 366.
54. Id. at 375-76.
55. Id. at 376.
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control of an automobile, the arrestee's vehicle is usually impounded.
Police agencies issue specific directions to their officers to search these
vehicles as part of the impounding process.5 6 Police frequently find incriminating evidence during these inventory searches, and use the evidence against the arrestee at his trial on the charge for which he was
originally arrested 7 or in a separate prosecution resulting from the seizure
of contraband or new evidence. 8 Courts have balanced three major justifications for the inventory procedure against the diminished expectation
of privacy associated with an automobile. These justifications are the
protection of police against false claims of theft, the duty of the police
to protect valuables left in the automobile during the owner's absence,
and the protection of the police against potential danger.5 9 These criteria
have become the standard for reasonableness in inventory searches.
1. Claims of Theft.
The police may be liable for claims of theft if items left in their
possession disappear.' Such claims may be bona fide or spurious. Some
courts have upheld inventories as constitutionally reasonable because the
itemizing of the contents in an impounded vehicle affords protection
against false claims. 6' False claims are avoided by securing the listed
valuables. Critics, however, have pointed out that an unscrupulous officer
might simply avoid listing an item on the inventory, or an unscrupulous
claimant might simply allege that the police took the item during the
inventory procedure.62
2. Protection of Property.
Courts have also justified inventories because of the protection they
afford to the owner's property. 63 Many states generally charge police with
the responsibility for protecting private property.' In United States v.
56. See, e.g., Albuquerque Police Department Standard Operating Procedures Manual, § 3-12 to
3-12-18 (Apr. 1982). Section 3-12-8 provides: "An inventory will be made of the property in a
vehicle to be towed."
57. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
58. See United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1970).
59. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1976).
60. See Cabbler v. Superintendent, 528 F.2d 1142, 1144 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
817 (1976) (impoundment of defendant's car held reasonable as sound police practice to protect
both the defendant from loss and the city from damage claims).
61. Id.; United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960, 961 (9th Cir. 1972).
62. Justice Powell noted this possibility in his concurring opinion in South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. at 376 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. See United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960, 961-62 (9th Cir. 1972) (patrolman acted reasonably in placing valuables found on front seat of impounded car on the floor in front of passenger
side of front seat).
64. See, e.g., Albuquerque Police Department Standard Operating Procedures Manual, § 3-12 to
3-12-18 (Apr. 1982); United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 469 (5th Cir. 1973).

Summer 1983]

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Kelehar,65 the Fifth Circuit allowed the admission of evidence seized
during an inventory search of the defendant's car. "The . ..search of
defendant's car was in compliance with standard inventory procedure,
fulfilling the . . . purpose of protecting the defendant's property and
safeguarding the police from groundless claims for 'lost' possessions. 66
3. Protection from Danger.
The third justification for inventories, protection of the police from
danger, has evolved from the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v.
California.67 In Cooper, police arrested the defendant for selling heroin
and impounded his car pending forfeiture proceedings. The police searched
the defendant's car one week following the impoundment. The defendant's conviction rested in part on evidence seized from the glove compartment of the petitioner's impounded car. Even though state law authorized
the search, the Supreme Court did not base its decision on that justification
alone. "[T]he question here is not whether the search was authorized by
state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment." 6 Justice Black stated: "It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car in their custody for
such a length of time, had no right, even for their own protection, to
search it.", 69 Justice Black made this statement even though no danger
was apparent. In Cady v. Dombrowski,7 0 the Supreme Court stressed solely
the protection from danger rationale as the basis for the determination of
reasonableness."
C. The Inventory Search in New Mexico
In State v. Vigil,72 the New Mexico Court of Appeals established inventory searches as an exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. In that case, police impounded the defendant's car subsequent
to his custodial arrest on assault charges. Pursuant to police regulations,
officers inventoried the contents of the vehicle. In the course of conducting
the inventory, they found in the trunk a brown paper bag containing
marijuana. The court of appeals held that where the initial intrusion into
a vehicle lawfully in police custody is justified, an inventory of the
contents, including closed containers, is justified.7 3
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

470 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 178.
386 U.S. 58 (1967).
Id. at 61.
Id. at 61-62.
413 U.S. 433 (1973).
Id. at 447. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text for further discussion of Cady.
86 N.M. 388, 524 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1974).
Id. at391, 524 P.2d at 1007.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized the validity of inventory
searches in State v. Ruffino. 74 In that case, defendant's vehicle was impounded following his arrest on a minor charge. An officer, pursuant to
standard police regulations, inventoried the contents of the vehicle including the items in the trunk. These items included a shotgun and shells.
The court held that the search was valid and set forth the requirements
for a valid inventory search. First, the vehicle to be inventoried must be
in police control and custody." The custody of the vehicle must be based
on some legal ground and there must be some nexus between the arrest
and the reason for the impounding .76 Second, officers must make the
inventory pursuant to established police regulations. 77 Third, the search
must be reasonable. 78 In addition, if during an inventory search police
discover evidence or other seizable items,
they should obtain a search
79
warrant before they seize the evidence.
A comparison between State v. Ruffino and South Dakotav. Opperman °
indicates that the New Mexico Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court use differing criteria to judge the reasonableness of an
inventory search.8 Several of the requirements for a valid inventory search
set forth by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Ruffino are similar to
those set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Opperman. Both
require the exercise of lawful police custody over the vehicle and an
inventory conducted pursuant to established police regulations.8 2 Both
cases state that the search must be reasonable. 83 Both the Supreme Court
and state court indicate that an inventory search will be held reasonable
if it is aimed at protecting the car and its contents or protecting police
from false claims or potential danger.84
Ruffino, differing from Opperman, stated that "there must be some
nexus between the arrest and the reason for impounding." 8 5 The court
86
gave no example of a valid nexus, but cited Preston v. United States
8
7
and United States v. Lawson, two cases in which the United States
Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit, respectively, found no nexus.
74. 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980).
75. Id. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
81. For a more detailed discussion of these differences, see Stelzner, CriminalProcedure, Survey
of New Mexico Law: 1980-81, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 271, 286-89 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Stelzner].
82. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369; Ruffino, 94 N.M. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
83. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375; Ruffino, 94 N.M. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
84. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 373; Ruffino, 94 N.M. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
85. 94 N.M. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
86. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
87. 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973).
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Opperman did not consider whether a nexus was required. In addition,
Ruffino stated that "[i]f during an inventory search evidence of a crime
is discovered, a search warrant should normally be obtained prior to
seizing the evidence." 88 These additional requirements in Ruffino indicate
that New Mexico places greater restrictions on inventory searches than
did the United States Supreme Court in Opperman.8 9 As noted in the next
section of this Note, the court in Williams retained the requirement that
there be a nexus between the arrest and the reason for impounding, but
abandoned the requirement that a warrant be obtained prior to seizing
evidence found during an inventory search.
D. Application of the Ruffino Test to State v. Williams
In State v. Williams, the New Mexico Supreme Court restated the
Ruffino requirements for a valid inventory search.' Applying the first
requirement, the court found that Williams' vehicle was in police custody.9 Interestingly, the court stated that the defendant did not assert that
his vehicle was not in police custody. 92 As noted in the dissenting opinion,
the defendant alleged that the search and seizure of his automobile was
"not valid as an inventory search because the automobile was lawfully
parked and there was no necessity to remove it into police custody. " 93
Because the majority dismissed this allegation without discussion, the
inference is that police custody over the defendant's keys bestows custody
and control over whatever the keys unlock. The dissenting opinion addressed the weakness of this custody argument. Justice Sosa noted that
the police did not know of the existence of the automobile nor of its
location at the time of the arrest and that under this circumstance, police94
exercise of control and custody over the automobile was questionable .
The majority next examined whether a nexus existed between the arrest
and the reason for impounding the vehicle. The majority cited Preston
v. United States95 in discussing the nexus issue. 96 In Preston, police
arrested the defendant and two other men for vagrancy and took them to
police headquarters. An officer then drove the defendant's car, which had
not been searched at the time of arrest, to the police station, and later to
a garage where police searched the car. During the search, police discovered evidence which was later used in the defendant's trial. 97 The
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

94 N.M. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
Stelzner, supra note 81, at 287.
97 N.M. at 636, 642 P.2d at 1095.
Id. at 637, 642 P.2d at 1096.
Id. at 636, 642 P.2d at 1095.
Id. at 638, 642 P.2d at 1097 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
Id.
376 U.S. 364 (1964).
97 N.M. at 636, 642 P.2d at 1095.
376 U.S. at 365-66.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

United States Supreme Court held that the evidence seized was inadmissible because it was too remote in time or place to be treated as incidental
to arrest and therefore it failed to meet the test of reasonableness under
the fourth amendment.98
In Ruffino, the New Mexico Supreme Court had cited Preston to illustrate that there must be some nexus between a person's arrest and the
reason for impounding that person's vehicle.9 9 In Williams, the court
repeated this illustration and further stated that: "The only relevance of
Preston to inventory search cases is in its example of a nexus between
the arrest and the impoundment."" The Williams court indicated that
Ruffino cited Preston to demonstrate that no compelling need must be
present to justify impoundment of a vehicle incident to an arrest.' 0'
The court's characterization of Preston is incorrect. Preston did not
raise the issue of an inventory search, but dealt with a search incident to
' which followed Preston in a line of
an arrest. Cooper v. California,02
United States Supreme Court cases involving warrantless searches, pointed
out that Preston had refuted any notion that the police could routinely
seize or search a vehicle after having arrested the driver and passengers.
In Cooper, the Supreme Court in its analysis of Preston stated that:
Preston was arrested for vagrancy. An arresting officer took his car
to the station rather than just leaving it on the street. It was not
suggested that this was done other than for Preston's convenience
or that the police had any right to impound the car. .

.

. The fact

that the police had custody of Preston's car was totally unrelated to
the vagrancy charge for which they arrested him. So was their subsequent search of the car.'03
Preston, therefore, does not give an example of a nexus between an arrest
and the impounding of a vehicle. The New Mexico Supreme Court's
reliance on Preston in Williams was unhelpful and confusing.
Similarly, the majority in Williams incorrectly cited United States v.
Lawson"° as an illustration of a nexus between an arrest and an impoundment. In Lawson, police arrested the defendant on a charge of
writing checks based on insufficient funds. The police impounded the
defendant's car, which was legally parked in a motel parking lot, and
took it to the police station. The police inventoried the contents of the
car and found a revolver in the locked trunk of the car."0 5 The Eighth
98. Id. at 368.
99. 94 N.M. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
100. 97 N.M. at 636, 642 P.2d at 1095.
101. Id. at 637, 642 P.2d at 1096.
102. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
103. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
104. 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973).
105. Id. at 469.
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Circuit, relying on the test of reasonableness, struck down the inventory
search. The court stated that it did not wish to create an exception for
"searches incident to police custody and control."106 The court did not
specifically address the issue of a connection between the arrest of the
defendant and the impoundment of the defendant's car.
Although not cited by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Williams,
Cooper v. CaliforniaI°7 gives the best illustration of a nexus between an
arrest and the impounding of a vehicle. In Cooper, a California state
court convicted the defendant of a narcotics violation partly based on
evidence seized in a warrantless search of the defendant's car one week
after his arrest. Pursuant to a statutory provision requiring the seizure
and forfeiture of vehicles used in violation of the narcotics laws, police
had impounded the defendant's car as evidence. The United States Supreme Court upheld the search and carefully showed why a nexus existed
between the defendant's arrest and the reason for impounding the vehicle:
Here the officers seized petitioner's car because they were required
to do so by state law. They seized it because of the crime for which
they arrested petitioner. They seized it to impound it and they had
to keep it until forfeiture proceedings were concluded. Their subsequent search of the car-whether the State had "legal title" to it
or not-was closely related to the reason petitioner was arrested, the
reason his car had been impounded, and the reason it was being
retained. "o
In Williams, the court found that the possible use of the defendant's
vehicle as evidence of a crime supplied the nexus between the arrest and
the impounding of the vehicle." The state argued that the vehicle was
evidence of a means of escape. The defendant's car, parked behind the
grocery store, could lead to the inference that the defendant had formulated a plan of escape, thereby indicating consciousness of guilt. This
evidence, however, is at best only tenuous. The existence of the defendant's locked and legally parked car might aid in the proof of theft of a
motor vehicle, but adds nothing to the state's burden of proof of armed
robbery: "the theft of anything of value from the person of another...
by use or threatened use of force or violence . ..while armed with a
deadly weapon."" 0 Justice Sosa, in his dissent, noted that "[s]ince the
police did not even know whether a vehicle existed . . . or whether the
vehicle could be evidence of a crime, there could be no nexus between
the arrest and the impoundment.""'
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at476.
386 U.S. 58 (1967).
Id.at 61.
97 N.M. at 637, 642 P.2d at 1096.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-2 (1978).
97 N.M. at 638, 642 P.2d 1097 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
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In Opperman, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that an
inventory search would be held reasonable if it is made to further the
protection of the owner's property, the protection of the police from false
claims, or the protection of police from potential danger.11 2 There was
no assertion in Williams that the inventory search was conducted for any
of these reasons, but the court found the search to be reasonable. The
majority entirely disregarded these requirements for an inventory search.
In addition, Ruffino stated that if evidence of a crime is discovered during
an inventory search, a search warrant should normally be obtained prior
to seizing the evidence. 1 3 In Williams, the officer did not obtain a warrant
prior to seizing the items. The supreme court, by failing to mention this
requirement, seemed to indicate that this requirement is not of constitutional dimension and only expresses a preference for obtaining a warrant
under such circumstances. This requirement is, therefore, meaningless,
and it appears that during any inventory search in which police find
evidence, they need not obtain a warrant prior to seizing that evidence.
Ruffino also required that police conduct the inventory search pursuant
to established police regulations." 4 The police department standard operating procedure allowed the owner of the vehicle, prior to its being
towed, to select a wrecker of his choice, or to release his vehicle to a
qualified driver present at the scene, or to legally park the car, unless the
police needed the vehicle as evidence of a crime. 1 In Williams the police
apparently made no attempt to obtain the defendant's consent before they
took the vehicle into protective custody." 6 The court found that because
the vehicle was evidence of a crime," 7 there was no need to give the
defendant a choice as to the disposition of the car." 8 Furthermore, one
of the reasons alleged by the officer for locating the defendant's automobile was that he believed he would find additional evidence in the
automobile.' This reason directly contradicts the Supreme Court's requirements for an inventory search. Justice Powell pointed out in his
concurring opinion in Opperman that:
112. 428 U.S. at 373-74.
113. 94 N.M. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
114. Id.
115. Albuquerque Police Department Standard Operating Procedures Manual § 314.02 (Nov.
1977). The current procedures manual provides that a vehicle may be towed 1) ifthe vehicle is
found to be in violation of any city ordinance; 2) when the driver of the vehicle has been found to
be incapacitated by the use of alcohol or drugs; 3) when the driver has been hospitalized or arrested;
or 4) when the vehicle has been abandoned, wrecked or vandalized or parked in such a manner as
to cause a traffic hazard.
Albuquerque Police Department Standard Operating Procedures Manual, § 3-12-2 (Apr. 1982).
116. See 97 N.M. at 636, 642 P.2d at 1095.
117. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
118. 97 N.M. at 637, 642 P.2d at 1096.
119. Id. at 638, 642 P.2d at 1097 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
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[i]nventory searches ... are not conducted in order to discover

evidence of a crime. The officer does not make a discretionary determination to search based on a judgment that certain conditions are
present. Inventory searches are conducted in accordance with established police department
20 rules or policy and occur whenever an
automobile is seized. 1
Further, the majority in Opperman stated that "there is no suggestion
whatsoever that this standard procedure

. . .

was a pretext concealing an

investigatory police motive. "121
The majority in Williams openly approved a search as an inventory
search which would otherwise be classified as an investigatory search. If
such reverse justification is permissible, the current limitations on police
authority to conduct an inventory search may become meaningless: in
every situation where incriminating evidence is found in an inventory
search, an admittedly investigatory search could become justifiable under
the pretext of this exception.
CONCLUSION
New Mexico was among a growing number of jurisdictions which
recognized that a threshold prerequisite to any inventory search of an
automobile is, at the very least, an initial lawful and reasonable impounding of that vehicle. 122 In State v. Williams, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court allowed the prerequisite to erode. The court failed to
demonstrate adequately the necessity for impounding the defendant's
automobile. At the time police arrested the defendant inside of the grocery
store, his car was legally parked on a street behind the store., 23 There
was no apparent danger to the car or to its contents and the car, in turn,
posed no irremediable danger to the flow of traffic.
Furthermore, the court, by this opinion, allows the police to have lawful
custody of a car before they are even aware of its existence. As Justice
Sosa noted in his dissenting opinion:
Control and custody of keys is not sufficient to have control and
custody of the items the keys will open. The logical extension of the

majority's holding is that a police officer who legally obtains the
keys of an accused may then proceed to open a locked suitcase,
safety deposit box, and possibly a house.'24
120. 428 U.S. at 376, 383 (Powell, J., concurring).
121. Id.at 376.
122. State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980); See Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537, 544,
551-54, 577 (1973).
123. 97 N.M. at 636, 642 P.2d at 1095.
124. 97 N.M. at 638, 642 P.2d at 1097 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
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The potential ramifications of the New Mexico Supreme Court decision
illustrate that expansion of the inventory search exception was not justified
by the facts presented in this case. One of the chief bases for an inventory
search is to protect the police who arrest the driver of a vehicle from
later claims by that driver of lost or stolen property. As Justice Sosa noted
in his dissent, although police are presently not liable for any vehicle
that ultimately may be connected to the arrestee, the use of the community
caretaking rationale to justify the search here may well create such liability. 125.Extended liability, while detrimental to any police officer engaged in the performance of his duties, does not serve to benefit society
as a whole, and emphasizes the overbreadth of the application of the
inventory search exception to the facts of Williams.
Furthermore, the failure to consult the wishes of the defendant, as was
done in Williams, belies the claim that an inventory search is conducted,
in part, to protect the defendant's personal property. To permit an otherwise prohibited intrusion because it is "routine police policy" is to allow
the fourth amendment protection of privacy to "approach the evaporation
point." 126 The essential test of the validity of a search is reasonableness,
yet the standard of reasonableness should be evolved in light of the fourth
amendment, not in light of what the police think reasonable procedures
might be.
The operation or possession of an automobile does not destroy a person's right to keep property contained therein free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.1 27 After State v. Williams, police will be allowed
wide latitude in conducting an inventory as long as they are acting pursuant
to a police regulation. Police regulations, however, should not be a constitutional touchstone unless we are willing to entrust our liberties to the
discretion of the police commissioner, rather than to a detached and neutral
magistrate.
ROBERTA BEYER

125. Id.
126. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969).
127. United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 1973).

